Trust-by-Design: Evaluating Issues and Perceptions within Clinical Passporting by Abramson, Will et al.
Page 1 of 20
Blockchain in Healthcare TodayTM ISSN 2573-8240 online https://doi.org/10.30953/bhty.v3.140 
Trust by Design: Evaluating Issues and Perceptions within Clinical 
Passporting
Will Abramson,1 Dr Nicole E. van Deursen,2 William J Buchanan1
Affiliations: 1Blockpass ID Lab, School of Computing, Edinburgh Napier University, Edinburgh, UK; 2National 
Cyber Security Centre, The Hague, The Netherlands, Edinburgh Napier University, Edinburgh, UK
Corresponding Author: William J Buchanan, Blockpass ID Lab, School of Computing, Edinburgh Napier 
University, Edinburgh. w.buchanan@napier.ac.uk
Keywords: Digital Credentials, Trust, Healthcare, Passporting, SSI, Design
Section: Original Clinical Research
A substantial administrative burden is placed 
on healthcare professionals as they manage 
and progress through their careers. Identity 
verification, pre-employment screening, and 
appraisals: the bureaucracy associated with 
each of these processes takes precious time 
out of a healthcare professional’s day. Time 
that could have been spent focused on patient 
care. In the midst of the COVID-19 crisis, it 
is more important than ever to optimize these 
professionals’ time. This article presents the 
synthesis of a design workshop held at the Royal 
College of Physicians of Edinburgh (RCPE) 
and subsequent interviews with healthcare 
professionals. The main research question posed 
is whether these processes can be re-imagined 
using digital technologies, specifically self-
sovereign identity? A key contribution in the 
article is the development of a set of user-led 
requirements and design principles for identity 
systems used within healthcare. These are then 
contrasted with design principles found in the 
literature. The results of this study confirm the 
need and potential of professionalizing identity 
and credential management throughout a 
healthcare professional’s career.
INTRODUCTION
While the COVID-19 crisis has brought the 
challenges of staff mobility into the spotlight, 
the administrativ e burden placed on a 
healthcare professional throughout their career 
has always been present. Over the years, 
healthcare service providers have increased the 
minimum standard for identity verification and 
pre-employment checks in line with new 
regulations.1,2 As a result, the time spent on 
these processes has increased. A House of 
Lord’s report, for example, estimated that 
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25,000 junior doctor days a year were currently 
being spent on these administrative tasks.3 In 
addition to this, digitization of healthcare 
services has further increased the time and 
complexity associated with managing one’s 
career. In a 2011 US survey, 87% of physicians 
stated that the leading cause of stress was down 
to administration,4 and a study of Finnish 
physicians found that poorly functioning IT 
systems continue to be a major cause of stress, 
particularly for those in highly time pressured 
roles.5
In a crisis like the COVID-19 outbreak, the 
need for a healthcare service to react to rapidly 
evolving, location-specific stresses at a trust or 
hospital level cannot be clearer. Different 
locations may hit their peak at different times, 
while some areas may only be minimally 
affected.6 However, consultation with a Royal 
College of Physicians of Edinburgh (RCPE) 
trainee suggests that on-boarding into a new 
trust or hospital can take up to 2 days. This is 
2 days of precious time that could potentially 
have been spent saving lives. Technological 
solutions have regularly been heralded for their 
ability to reduce inefficiencies and streamline 
patient care. Blockchain technology is just one 
of the more recent innovations predicted to have 
a disruptive impact.7
Often though, the reality in the hospitals is 
different to the design assumptions made by 
technologists, and the productivity benefits are 
not always obvious.8
This article thus presents an initial set of design 
principles for any technical solution attempting 
to reduce the administrative burdens currently 
placed on healthcare professionals. An analysis 
of discourse about digital identities, verifiable 
claims, and trust has led to a theoretical set of 
trust and design principles. These principles 
were validated in a workshop with healthcare 
organizations held at the RCPE. This research 
takes an initial step towards understanding the 
problem space from the perspective of those 
currently experiencing it and lays the 
foundation for future quantitative studies in 
this area.
Research Questions
This article evaluates a use case in which a 
person can digitally obtain, manage, and present 
his/her professional credentials and personally 
identifiable data within an healthcare system. 
We limited the scope of the work to healthcare 
professionals, as these are identified as being 
burdened with administrative tasks associated 
with identity verification and pre-employment 
checks, as well as recording and managing their 
credentials as they progress through their career, 
a burden which is generally expected to take 
place in people’s personal lives. The following 
research questions were identified:
• What are the identity interactions that a 
healthcare professional must manage 
throughout their career?
• How might self-sovereign identity 
technology be used to simplify a healthcare 
professional identity administration?
• How do the design principles of self-
sovereign identity stated in the literature and 
technical sphere meet the requirements of the 
healthcare professionals who would actually 
be using these systems?
RELATED LITERATURE
Berwick, Nolan, and Whittington define the 
Triple Aim focusing on improving the care, 
health, and cost when accessing healthcare 
performance in the United States.9 They point 
out that these goals are interdependent so must 
be considered together when planning and 
evaluating healthcare changes. It has been 
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suggested that this framework should be 
extended to consider a fourth aim, care for the 
provider,10 due to reports that staff burnout and 
dissatisfaction are widespread. As care 
providers are on the frontline when it comes to 
achieving the triple aim for healthcare services, 
including their well-being into this assessment 
makes sense.
Healthcare Professional Credentials
Healthcare providers have a requirement to 
maintain strong identity verification checks 
to ensure that their employees are who 
they claim to be and that they have the 
required skills and training for the job.2,11,12 
Unfortunately, there have been examples 
throughout the world of doctors practicing 
without licenses. This puts patients’ lives at 
risk and reduces the trust in the profession as 
a whole. Examples include the UK General 
Medical Council recently having to recheck 
credentials of 3,000 doctors after a fraudulent 
psychiatrist was found to have practiced for 
23 years without proper credentials,13 the case 
of a social worker in Canada involved in more 
than 100 child protection cases,14 and the 
notorious US case of Christopher Duntsch 
a.k.a Dr Death.15
As a consequence, credentialing healthcare 
professionals is a crucial process in healthcare 
systems throughout the world. However, the 
current practices of many systems add huge 
overheads to both the administrators and the 
healthcare professionals. In a report on 
healthcare and digital credentials, the US 
Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB)11 
analyze the use of digital credentials in 
healthcare, looking at the potential for both 
current technology and future technology to 
streamline the process and enhance trust in the 
system. The implementation of the Federation 
Credentials Verification Service (FCVS) in 
1996,16 an NCQA-certified platform providing a 
centralized service for obtaining primary source, 
verified education information for medical 
practitioners applying for licensing in the United 
States. As the report11 outlines, the FCVS 
reduced the time to obtain a license from 60 days 
to 25 days, a significant reduction. However, 
efforts to improve the FCVS highlighted the 
underutilization of technology in the process. 
Furthermore, 66% of this time is driven by 
parties outside of the control of the FCVS.11 
These credential verification organizations are 
often redundant and increase the cost of the 
whole process. The report highlights the 
movement to disintermediate the creation 
and management of credentials, hinting at a 
movement toward individual ownership of 
credentials.
Along with this, there is an increasing need 
for clinical staff to provide digital evidence 
of their training, skills, and experience. Read 
et al.17 investigated the usage of a passporting 
system for surgery clerkship and found that 
those involved often found that it improved 
student’s reporting of their performance in 
basic clinical skills.
Self-Sovereign Identity
Digital identifiers—and the trust entities place 
in them—enable many modern societal 
interactions. They thus allow organizations to 
perform critical activities with increased levels 
of trust. Another way of looking at it is from a 
risk perspective and where digital identifiers and 
account information correlated with an identifier 
that helps organizations make risk-based 
decisions associated with a particular interaction 
and value exchange. Unfortunately, traditional 
identity management systems continue to have 
security risks,18 such as: credential theft or loss, 
biometric impersonation, document forgery, and 
identity theft.
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SSI uses a new type of identifier currently 
going through standardization at the W3C, a 
decentralized identifier (DID).19 A DID is an 
identifier under the sole domain of an entity, 
typically the entity that created it. It is 
cryptographically verifiable and independent of 
any central authority. Rather than being 
assigned an identifier on account creation, DIDs 
let individuals provide their own identifiers for 
their digital relationships.
Systems built following an SSI architecture 
could offer the opportunity to rethink the 
entire credential process for physicians. 
Before the electronic transmission of 
credentials can be put forward as a viable 
option for healthcare professionals, it must 
be considered if such a process would break 
any of the rules and regulations currently 
governing this area. The key things 
identity verification and authentication 
process must satisfy for most healthcare 
services are2,11:
• Is it possible to verify the authenticity of the 
claim?
• Is the claim a primary source attestation. 
For example, is your degree certification 
a certificate from the university you attended?
• Was the credential securely delivered from 
the credential holder to the verifier?
• Is there a clear, verifiable audit trail that can 
trace the origin of this credential?
These points can, in fact, all be satisfied digitally 
through the use of digital signatures.
The problem of scaling digital identities into 
healthcare systems has led many people to 
explore alternative methods to identify and 
authenticate people and things in the digital 
sphere. One of the proposed architectures is 
commonly referred to as self-sovereign identity 
(SSI). Connor-Green identifies that SSIs could 
be one of the core use cases of blockchain in 
health.20 Liang et al. outline a blockchain 
approach within a healthcare management 
system, where the distributed nature of SSIs 
supports a scalable infrastructure that moves 
away from the centralized control of identity 
within many existing healthcare infrastructures 
(Figure 1).21,22
METHOD
The goal of the workshop was to gather a set of 
values and principles that can be used to evaluate 
emerging technology for identity systems within 
healthcare. Terminology and definitions are often 
much contested in different contexts. We used 
definitions provided in the selected papers as 
much as possible, but some definitions were 
adapted to better fit our goal to measure the 
value or principle.
The next step in our research was a workshop 
organized at RCPE. It involved 14 participants 
with a wide ranging experience of different 
aspects of the healthcare system. The 
participants for the workshop were selected 
through consultation with the RCPE, and who 
were able to use their contacts to invite a 
diverse range of attendees. This included 
clinicians, RCPE trainees, and RCPE staff 
involved in data management, digital 
transformation, and education, as well as a 
representative from the General Medical 
Council (GMC). While no personal data was 
captured during the workshop and all attendees 
remain anonymous, explicit consent was 
obtained and the research aims were explained 
at the beginning of the workshop.
During the workshop, the participants evaluated 
the fit of SSI within the healthcare domain. 
First, a process mapping exercise was used to 
develop an understanding of the current system, 
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looking at the identity data exchanges and key 
entities that verify or attest to identity attributes 
of healthcare professionals throughout their 
career.
Then, these identity moments were re-imagined 
within an SSI-enabled ecosystem, and this story 
was told in an interactive manner using physical 
props and audience participation in order to 
convey the capabilities that SSI systems could 
provide for healthcare professionals, without 
going into unnecessary technical detail. Finally, 
the workshop participants were asked to 
evaluate the positive and negative aspects of the 
identity management system. The participants 
expressed their requirements, values, and 
expectations. The list that was distilled from 
these workshop discussions was compared 
against the list of design principles from the 
desk research.
DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR SELF-
SOVEREIGN IDENTITY SYSTEMS
The success of any SSI system depends not only 
on the technical feasibility but also on the user 
acceptance and trust in the system. With users 
we mean all stakeholders (entities) within a 
specific context that will use that system 
together. Trust is harder to define, as there exist 
more than 70 definitions in academic 
literature.23 Trust is seen as a human strategy to 
cope with uncertainty, such as those we face in 
relations, actions, and innovation.24 In a digital 
context, trust is often transferred to cybersecurity 
measures such as technological controls, 
certificates, and organizational compliance 
frameworks. In SSI systems, at least some aspects 
of this trust shifts from trust between people 
toward confidence that is placed in cryptographic 
systems. As Smolenski25 frames it: trust is being 
depersonalized. Designing new digital identity 
Figure 1—Patient-centric personal health data management system.21
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systems means mimicking real-life situations in a 
digital way. Human values, such as ethics and 
trust, need a digital equivalent that users need to 
accept and understand. How do we design trust 
from the start? Which design principles are most 
valued by users and most likely to establish trust 
in these systems?
There are many papers that refer to the Laws 
of Identity (coined by Cameron in 2005)26 as 
the foundation for design principles. These 
laws explain the dynamics causing digital 
identity systems to succeed or fail in various 
contexts. Although written before the era of 
SSI, Cameron himself finds the laws still 
relevant, also for identity systems on the 
blockchain and decentralized identity.27 He 
points out, for instance, that the first four  
of the laws are also requirements within 
the GDPR.
In 2016, Christopher Allen28 wrote 10 principles 
inspired by (among others) the work of Cameron. 
His aim was to ensure that user control is at the 
heart of SSI. Allen pointed out that identity can 
be a double-edged sword: it can be used for both 
beneficial and maleficent purposes. Therefore, 
he states: an identity system must balance 
transparency, fairness, and support of the 
commons with protection for the individual. The 
Sovrin Foundation29 adopted Allen’s principles 
and arranged them in three sections, but this 
causes some confusion as they used one principle 
twice and made another principle a section above 
other principles. Other researchers and 
developers have used Cameron’s or Allen’s 
principles for inspiration and adapted them to 
their own lists of features. However, testing of 
SSI systems against these features and design 
principles is still rare.
Dunphy and Petitcolas30 evaluated three identity 
management solutions (uPort, Sovrin, and 
ShoCard) against Cameron’s laws of identity. 
Their overview shows that none of the solutions 
meets all seven laws, and none of them meets 
the law of human integration: usability, user 
understanding, and user experience. They state 
that none of the schemes they evaluated are 
accompanied by an evidence-based vision of 
user interaction. One of the limitations is usable 
end-user key management for nontechnical 
users that remains unaddressed. Furthermore, 
they express concern about tightening 
regulation, such as the GDPR, that sometimes 
contradicts the transparency of data storage in 
these solutions. Finally, most solutions provide 
only ad hoc trust, as trust relies on integration 
between participating entities, and methods to 
achieve trust in the context of identity attributes 
are still evolving.
Ferdous et al.31 elaborated on the principles of 
Allen and designed a taxonomy of essential 
properties for SSI. Then, they compared four 
blockchain-based SSI systems (uPort, Jolo, 
Sovrin, Blockcerts) against the properties, and 
through desk research, they found that most of 
the systems satisfy most of the properties. 
Similar work was done in a student project32 
where students compared eight blockchain-
based (IDchainz, Uport, EverID, Sovrin, 
LifeID, Selfkey, Shocard, Sora) and three 
non-blockchain-based SSI systems (PDS, 
IRMA, reclaimID) against each of Allen’s 
principles with one additional principle.33 They 
concluded that some of the blockchain-based 
solutions fulfill all properties, but that some of 
the non-blockchain-based implementations meet 
most of the criteria as well. Interestingly, their 
conclusions as to whether the properties are met 
do not always match the conclusions of Ferdous 
et al.31 for two systems (Uport and Sovrin) that 
both projects evaluated. Toth and Anderson-
Priddy34 validated nine properties from earlier 
sources (e.g., Allen and Sovrin Foundation) and 
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added new properties. They applied these 
properties to their architecture for digital 
identity and reasoned how these apply to their 
solution (NexGenID).
To the best of our knowledge, published 
evaluation of values and principles with users in 
a specific SSI context is very rare. One project 
that focused on citizens and digital identity 
systems in general (not SSI specific) was the 
Digital Identity lab in the Netherlands. In several 
interactive sessions with citizens, they found 
which values matter the most for digital 
identities.35 The research methods included 
interviews in the streets, meet-ups, expert 
sessions, and design sprints. The results include 
evaluation quadrants to plot digital identity 
providers and an overview of values that citizens 
find important and that can be used as input for 
ethical design and trust of digital identity 
systems. Another project focusing on user 
experience is the IRMA Made Easy project.36 
IRMA (I Reveal My Attributes) is a self-
sovereign identity solution with a digital wallet. 
The IRMA Made Easy Project works on the 
design of the app and website with a focus on 
accessibility. The developers of IRMA point out 
that user experience design affects how users 
handle the control over their information. From 
their experience, they share three lessons:
1. In order for new technology to be adopted, 
they require a smooth user experience.
2. User experience design for privacy is not the 
same as general user experience design.
3. A system that puts people in control over 
their data does not always lead to people 
using that control to protect their privacy: it 
can even lead to the opposite when they are 
tricked by others.
From the literature study, we learned that there is 
a gap in academic research that includes 
evaluation of proposed SSI solutions from a user 
perspective with domain knowledge of the 
ecosystem. Furthermore, to the best of our 
knowledge, the most commonly used design 
principles have not been validated by users for 
importance and priority. Projects that included 
consumers focus on identity management in 
general, and studies on SSI systems tend to focus 
on the evaluation by technical experts through 
desk research. Furthermore, when SSI design 
principles and features indeed are evaluated, the 
researchers re-use existing frameworks or lists of 
principles without user elicitation for principles 
that technology experts have not imagined yet. If 
we do not understand the requirements of end 
users, then we run the risk of creating digital 
tools that no one wants to use, or worse 
introducing unintended consequences through 
the deployment of these systems to domains with 
poorly understood requirements. There are 
countless examples of technology being 
introduced into healthcare only to make the jobs 
of those working alongside this technology 
worse, like the 15 logins needed to access 
different NHS systems.37
We compared the different lists of principles, 
features, and values that we found and created 
an overview of different and overlapping 
principles. The results are presented in Table 1. 
The overview of principles was input for the 
next stage in our research, where we invited 
future users to express their opinion on 
principles and values. In the next section, 
we describe the workshop that we held with 
representatives of different entities in an 
ecosystem, in order to contribute to the 
knowledge of end-user perception and trust 
of SSI systems.
WORKSHOP DESCRIPTION
After a brief introduction, participants were 
asked to complete a warm up exercise where they 
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Table 1. List of design principles.
Cameron26 Allen28 Ferdous et al.31 De Waag35 Toth Anderson 
Priddy34
Existence Existence
User Control and 
Consent
Control and 
Consent
Consent Control Control and consent
Access Access Access Access
Transparency Transparency Transparency
Pluralism of operators 
and technologies
Portability Portability portability
Consistent experience 
across contexts
Interoperability Interoperability Interoperability
Persistence Persistence Persistence
Minimal disclosure 
for a constrained use
Minimalization Minimalization Data-minimalization
Protection Protection Security secure transactions 
and identity transfer
Autonomy Autonomy
Justifiable parties Choosability
Human integration Ease of use usability
Disclosure
Ownership
Directed identity Single source
Standard
Cost
Availability
Trust
Privacy
Integrity
Decentralization
Inclusivity
Reliability
Counterfeit prevention
Identity verification
Disclosure
Identity assurance
recorded different identity interactions that occur 
throughout a typical day in their life. This 
included using a RFID card, logging into a 
digital system with a username and password, 
and authenticating to a mobile device, bank card 
payments, anything that involved some form of 
identification and authentication. Participants 
were also asked to record times when 
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authentication failed, for example, through a 
rushed or forgotten password attempt.
The aim of the exercises was to get attendees 
thinking about how often they interact with 
digital systems, how many different username 
and passwords they currently manage, and the 
number of different authentication devices that 
they have to carry. The majority of participants 
recorded over 25 separate identity interactions, 
all in a single day.
Healthcare Ecosystem Process Mapping
The next stage of the workshop focused on eight 
core identity moments that captured at a high 
level the typical experiences of a doctor 
throughout their career. Participants were asked 
to create process maps identifying key 
organizations involved in each of these stages 
and the identity information that a doctor is 
required to present to them. Additionally, 
participants were asked to capture frustrations 
that a doctor might experience while navigating 
these identity moments. The general identity 
moments identified and validated prior to the 
workshop to provide some structure were as 
follows:
• Doctor graduating from university.
• Doctor applying for a job.
• Doctor joining a hospital.
• Doctor training.
• Doctor rotation.
• Doctor begins RCPE accreditation.
• Doctor qualifies as a physician.
• Doctor moves abroad.
Figure 2—Healthcare professional’s identity moments.
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The workshop participants were split into 
groups, and each group focused on four of 
the identity moments. The results were then 
presented back to the group providing a 
detailed overview of each of the stages in a 
doctor’s career, including recurring and trusted 
ecosystem entities such as the GMC (General 
Medical Council). These maps were combined 
and synthesized into a Gantt chart, showing the 
time burden and repetition associated with 
healthcare professionals as they progress 
through their career, see Figure 2. This was 
developed through follow-up communication 
with a final year trainee at the RCPE who 
attended the workshop.
Re-Imagining Identity Moments Using SSI
The next stage of the workshop involved an 
interactive session on self-sovereign identity 
and the capabilities it could provide healthcare 
professionals when applied to the key identity 
moments that participants previously mapped 
out. The goal was to give attendees a high level 
understanding of how this technology works 
and where it might fit into existing processes 
within healthcare.
Physical props were used to represent different 
aspects of the SSI system, and a number of 
workshop attendees were asked to play roles 
within the healthcare ecosystem. Specifically, 
six participants acted as the key entities and 
trust providers identified in the process 
mapping stages:
• A Medical School—Before becoming a 
licensed doctor, individuals must 
first complete a degree at a medical  
school.
• The General Medical Council—The doctor 
licensing body in the United Kingdom.
• The Royal College of Edinburgh—Royal 
colleges are involved with training and 
examination procedures for junior doctors as 
they gradually specialize in a medical 
discipline.
• Edinburgh Hospital—This hospital was 
used as the initial place of employment 
once the fictional doctor in our scenario 
graduated.
• Glasgow Hospital—This entity represented 
the doctor rotation process within the 
scenario modeled.
• Health Education Scotland—A body 
involved with continuous training and 
education of doctors.
The initial setup of the SSI healthcare ecosystem 
was represented by asking each actor in the 
scenario to generate a public/private key pair. A 
red (private) and green (public) card was used to 
show the two halves of a public/private key pair. 
Actors then attached their public key to a white 
card, which was used to represent a decentralized 
identifier (DID). All actors were asked to place 
their DID onto the wall, representing the act of 
registering a public DID on a distributed ledger 
such that the public keys for these trusted entities 
could be resolved by anyone.
After the initial setup, a member of the research 
team played the role of doctor and walked through 
each of the identity moments discussed and mapped 
in the process mapping session. This interactive 
approach was used for a couple of purposes:
• To educate workshop attendees about the 
capabilities that a self-sovereign identity 
(SSI) architecture enables.
• To illustrate how SSI could be applied to the 
healthcare domain to streamline identity 
interactions.
Throughout this interactive session, a flipchart 
was used to represent the doctors’ digital wallet. 
The wallet gradually collected verifiable 
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Table 2. The list of design principles was validated in a workshop.
Design Principle Definition
Existence The identity of a person exists independent of identity administrators or providers.
Control: The person is in control of their digital identity and is able to choose what 
personal data to share.
Autonomy A user is independent on creating identities, as many as required, without relying on 
any party and be able to update/remove it.
Disclosure A user must have the ability to selectively disclose particular attributes.
Ownership The user is the ultimate owner of an identity, including the claims.
Consent Data must be released only after the user has consented to do so.
Access The person has full access to their own data.
Single source A user is the single source of truth regarding the identity.
Transparency Systems and algorithms are transparent and anyone should be able to examine how 
they work.
Standard An identity must be based on open standards.
Cost Costs must be kept to minimum.
Portability Information and services about identity must be transportable to other services.
Interoperability Digital identities are continually available and as widely usable as possible.
Persistence An identity must be persistent as long as required by its owner.
Minimalization When data is disclosed, that disclosure should involve the minimum amount of data 
necessary to accomplish the task at hand. For example, if only a minimum age is 
called for, then the exact age should not be disclosed, and if only an age is requested, 
then the more precise date of birth should not be disclosed.
Protection The rights of users must be protected. When there is a conflict between the needs of 
the identity network and the rights of individual users, then the network should err on 
the side of preserving the freedoms and rights of the individuals over the needs of the 
network.
Availability An identity must be available and accessible from different platforms when required 
by its owner.
Human welfare The identity system must contribute to human well-being.
Non-maleficence The system will not cause harm to others.
Justice Systematic unfairness (false negatives/positives) is avoided.
Trustworthiness Expectations to act with good will towards others.
Privacy The user has the right to decide what data is shared and to set boundaries.
Dignity Dignity is intertwined with emotional identity. Technological solutions have a 
responsibility to uphold human dignity.
Solidarity Respectful cooperation between stakeholders.
Environmental 
welfare
The solution should cause no environmental harm.
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credentials represented as large post-it notes and 
digital relationships, formed through peer DID 
connections, were represented as small blue 
post-it’s within the wallet (see Figure 3).
Within an SSI system, there are generally four 
core interactions:
• Establishing a peer DID connection to 
initiate a digital relationship.
• Credential issuance.
• Proof request.
• Presentation of credential attributes in 
response to a proof request.
Each of these interactions was represented in this 
scenario as follows:
1. Establishing a peer DID connection: For 
this interaction, the action used was simply 
a handshake between the doctor and the party 
the doctor wished to connect with. For 
example, during the doctor qualifies from 
medical school process mapping, the doctor 
had to establish a connection with the GMC. 
While the handshake took place, participants 
were explained that this represented forming 
a private peer-to-peer communication 
channel across which message integrity and 
authenticated origin can be verified. It was 
illustrated that the connection was stored and 
managed by the digital wallet using a small 
blue post-it note.
The fact that these connections could be formed 
either face to face, or through a website, was 
additionally discussed. Explaining that you 
probably have more trust in a connection 
formed face to face and that trust can be built 
across these connections by sharing verifiable 
information.
This relationship once formed can last 
indefinitely, until one individual or the other 
decides to break it off. This means that the GMC 
or any entity could form more personal 
relationships with the doctors they license, 
enabling them to push them relevant 
communication across their secure 
communication channel.
Figure 3—A illustration of the workshop’s physical representation of an SSI ecosystem.
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2. Credential issuance: Credential issuance was a 
recurring SSI interaction that was represented in 
the scenario. The medical school issued the 
doctor their medical degree, the GMC issued 
their license, and the RCPE issued the doctors a 
qualified physician credential. All these 
credentials exist in the current system. They are 
attestations about the attributes and qualifications 
of a doctor, made by entities with the authority to 
make such claims. Before any credential issuance 
interaction, a secure connection must have been 
formed as discussed above this was highlighted 
through a handshake action.
Then workshop participants acting as the 
different trusted entities within the scenario 
were asked to write the name of the credential 
(a large post-it) and sign the credential using 
their private key—the red card they received 
as part of the setup. In reality, they used a wet 
signature to represent this. This helped 
convey the concept that once a credential has 
been signed it is impossible to change the 
contents of that credential without invalidating 
the signature—providing integrity to the 
credential.
For simplicity, the scenario did not represent 
individual attributes that credentials 
contained—for example, a GMC credential 
might contain the doctors’ name and their GMC 
license number. This was conveyed verbally 
instead.
During the session, the signature type—CL 
signatures, and the way that they work in the 
context of verifiable credentials was briefly 
touched upon, due to the importance to 
understand why a doctor couldn’t easily share a 
credential. Specifically, the doctor contributes 
some secret information in a blind manner into 
the signing protocol as one of the credential 
attributes. Such that when the credential is 
signed and given to the doctor, only they can 
prove they know the secret value that was 
signed by the issuer. Even the issuer does not 
know this.
The wall of trusted DIDs and their corresponding 
public keys was used to discuss how the doctors, 
or rather their wallets, could verify the signatures 
on any credentials they were issued to ensure 
they were valid. The doctor is also capable of 
refusing a credential or suggesting changes 
before accepting—for example, if the issuer had 
spelt his/her name wrongly.
3. Proof Request: A proof request is an SSI 
interaction whereby an entity, generally referred 
to as a verifier, requests proof of certain identity 
information from a holder—in this scenario the 
doctor. The verifier is able to additionally 
specify the credential schema that the identity 
information should come from and the credential 
issuer if they wish.
For example, in the ecosystem modeled there 
were only two hospitals—let’s call them 
Glasgow Hospital and Edinburgh hospital for 
simplicity, Edinburgh may request proof of a 
doctor’s name and DoB contained within an 
identity verification credential and only accept 
this proof if it was issued by Glasgow Hospital 
(represented by its DID).
This was a complex interaction that was 
challenging to represent within the scenario, 
so verbal communication was used to outline 
the majority of it. The actor representing the 
entity asking for a proof from the doctor wrote 
this request on a piece of card which was then 
passed to the doctor. It was made clear that this 
communication went across an already 
established DID connection and that proof 
requests could include a subset of attributes 
from across multiple credentials.
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4. Credential presentation: A credential 
presentation was the final SSI interaction used 
repeatedly throughout the scenario. This is the 
process by which a doctor, through the use of 
their digital wallet, responds to a proof request 
by creating a cryptographic presentation from 
one of more verifiable credentials within their 
wallet.
Within the scenario, this was illustrated by filling 
out a card and creating a wet signature on this 
card. The card was then passed to the entity/actor 
who requested the proof request. Again, a lot of 
the complexity was conveyed verbally. It was 
explained that a credential presentation is not the 
same as giving the credential within a digital 
wallet to the entity requesting it. A presentation is 
a new and distinct cryptographic object that is 
created from one or more credentials and can 
contain any number of attributes from these 
credentials. This has both privacy and security 
benefits.
Going back to the hospital example, Edinburgh 
may request a doctor to prove his/her name, date 
of birth, and GMC license number when initially 
employing a new doctor. This proof request can 
be responded to in a single credential presentation 
that combines the attributes from two separate 
credentials originally issued by different entities 
into a new object that is still cryptographically 
verifiable using the public keys of the issuers, the 
keys that are publicly available and were stuck on 
the wall during the initial setup.
Evaluating SSI design principles
The last session of the workshop involved 
presenting SSI in the context of traditional 
identity management systems such as federated 
and user-centric identity management systems.
Then asking for positive and negative aspects of 
the SSI system presented to them, challenges to 
its implementation were also collected through 
this process.
After this, eight design principles and their 
definitions selected from the literature were 
presented to the group. Mentimeter, a tool for 
audience engagement, was used to gauge how 
the participants valued these design principles. 
A couple of additional questions were also asked.
Before we introduced the design principles from 
the literature to our audience, we asked them 
what they thought was the most important feature 
of future technology that would help them trust 
it. The list included the following:
• Use all over the ecosystem, all entities need 
to participate.
• Attention for end users, usability, 
convenience, workable.
• Buy-in from government and NHS.
• Future proof.
• Resilient, reliable, fraud resilient, protection, 
security.
• Control.
• Transparent data sharing, clear, clarity.
Comparing this list with the list of design 
principles that we distilled from the literature 
demonstrates that our audience adds two specific 
principles to the generic list. The first is that they 
find it important to know that all entities will be 
involved in the SSI ecosystem, including the 
government and the NHS. The success of the 
system depends on buy-in of all of the involved 
entities and that is something that should be 
developed from the start. Second is the attention 
for usability and convenience. User engagement 
is important from the start and throughout the 
development process.
We selected eight principles from the literature 
and explained the definitions to the participants. 
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Then, we asked them to rank the principles in 
order of importance. The majority selected 
protection as the most important, followed by 
control and consent and interoperability. Then, 
we asked to rank importance for each individual 
principle. Again, the highest scores were for 
protection, control and consent, and 
interoperability. Figures 4 and 5 show the results 
of the Mentimeter polls. This was used to get a 
sense of the room and the figures should be 
interpreted with that in mind.
WORKSHOP RESULTS
The workshop led to a number of key learning 
elements about identity management for 
healthcare professionals. This can be generally 
summarized as being complex, fragmented, 
and time-consuming in its current form. 
The process mapping session led to an 
increased understanding of the identity 
landscape within healthcare. We began the 
session with eight identity moments that we 
framed as being chronological; the idea behind 
this was to provide a rough skeleton for 
participants to expand on in their process maps. 
It came to light that we missed a key identity 
moment within a doctor’s career, namely 
appraisal and re-validation. A process whereby 
healthcare professionals must prove to 
relevant authorities that they have gone 
through the relevant training to keep their 
skills up to date such that they can still 
practice. This is a repetitive process that occurs 
every 3 years. It was interesting to find out that 
even the top level professionals in attendance 
typically spent a couple of days every 3 years 
getting their documents in order for this 
procedure.
Another point of clarification was that while we 
positioned the eight identity moments as 
chronological, a lot of them happen in parallel. 
For example, a medical student typically gets 
identity checked by the GMC prior to graduating, 
and they also spend their final year applying for 
jobs so that on graduation they are ready to begin 
their career immediately. It was pointed out that 
there is no strict temporal relationship between 
the eight stages initially identified and a large 
part of the frustrations come from the fact that 
the majority of these stages are repeated over the 
course of a doctor’s career, each time requiring 
the same time-consuming procedure.
A good example of this comes from what we 
broadly termed doctor rotation, something 
commonly experienced within the healthcare 
system, especially for young doctors who can 
rotate to a new location and role as often as every 
4 months. While this reduces significantly as 
doctors progress in their career, it is still a 
common occurrence. Every time a doctor moves 
to a new hospital, there are a number of tasks that 
Figure 4—Principles ranked by importance.
Figure 5—Principles individually rated.
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the doctor needs to complete in order to on-board 
into the institution:
• They must complete a full identity 
verification check to the NHS standards.
• They must provide evidence supporting all 
the claims they made in their application. 
This is typically verified by a consultant, 
and there are estimates that this takes up to 
a full day of their time.
• They must complete an induction session, 
taking between 1 and 2 days. This induction 
is required for both new locations (e.g., 
hospitals) and new trusts and generally 
includes repeated content due to lack of 
standardization across locations and trusts.
• They must organize an appointment with 
occupational health, to prove they have 
up-to-date vaccinations. If they don’t or are 
unable to prove they do, then doctors must 
have their vaccinations refreshed, often 
leading to needless re-vaccinations.
Another big bugbear of the group, particularly 
from attendees still going through training, was 
keeping track of all the training events they had 
attended, including the need to enter this 
information into multiple distinct silos. This was 
further exacerbated by frustrating user experiences, 
different document format requirements, and even 
reviewers specifically asking for physical copies 
due to the added burden that reviewing digitally 
uploaded documents entailed, a clear example of 
how digital tools have failed healthcare 
professionals by increasing rather than reducing 
the burden placed on them to manage their 
professional careers.
To summarize, the process mapping and ensuing 
discussions highlighted numerous frustrations 
experienced by healthcare professionals just to 
meet the requirements for managing their career. 
A phrase that came up was the need to 
professionalize the digital experience throughout 
a doctor’s career.
The method for conveying the capabilities of 
SSI and how these might change the identity 
moments a doctor experiences throughout their 
career was a success. The majority of 
participants were engaged and achieved a good 
level of understanding as shown through the 
questions that this generated. Many of the 
participants indicated that they would be 
receptive to these changes being implemented, 
in particular a trainee at the RCPE was very 
supportive.
The workshops additionally surfaced a number 
of challenges that attendees thought would need 
to overcome in order to roll this out within a 
healthcare system. Many participants were 
senior professionals within healthcare, so had 
experiences of other attempts to digitize aspects 
of healthcare. The three core challenges 
identified were:
• Funding and business model: Who is 
paying for these tools and what is in it for 
them. There is no clear path to monetization 
of the system; however, for this to work, it 
needs to be well funded in order to produce 
something that can scale. It was suggested 
that part of a doctor’s annual fees and 
membership to organizations like the GMC 
and the Royal Colleges could be allocated 
toward a system like this.
• Adoption: An SSI system works only when 
it achieves large-scale adoption. In order for 
this to happen, it needs to be led on a 
national level and show the benefit to the 
entire ecosystem. It was also pointed out that 
while benefit to doctors is relatively easy to 
show it needs to be able to show benefit to 
the individual trusted entities. They need to 
be the ones advocating for this system not 
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the doctors. All stakeholders must be clear on 
why this shift is happening and what the 
benefit is to them.
• Overreaching: This technology is new and 
relatively untested at scale. An interesting 
point was made that it is important to take 
small steps to prove its value and build human 
trust before expanding the scope. Attempting 
anything too large too quickly and failing 
could be disastrous for the trust placed in the 
system and underlying technology.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, participants were largely in favor 
of the technology described in the workshop, at 
least from the viewpoint of its worth exploring 
further. A number of them were keen to be 
involved in further iterations, offering support 
finding additional doctors and medical students 
to further explore the requirements of any 
technical solution from their perspective. 
This research has further reinforced the 
importance of developing user-driven systems, 
ensuring that any solution that does get rolled out 
is meeting the actual needs of those it is designed 
for. The research identified overlooked design 
principles and also showed that the design 
principles commonly referred to within the 
academic literature, when explained, were also 
considered important by the system users within 
a healthcare context.
Next steps include developing a proof of 
concept which can then be validated with real 
users; this will include validating it against the 
properties deemed important by participants: 
Usability and security. Additionally, a medical 
student’s identity interactions in themselves 
seem complex, and it would be valuable to run 
another workshop specifically focusing on this 
area. This should provide a different 
perspective from that gained throughout this 
workshop.
The professionalization of the digital 
experience within a doctor’s career is long 
overdue. Furthermore, the COVID-19 crisis has 
highlighted just how important these solutions 
can be for the NHS and its individual trusts. 
Staffing needs fluctuate widely across the 
country, as different regions and hospitals hit 
their peaks of this crisis at different times. The 
ability to redeploy doctors to highly stressed 
areas within the NHin minutes rather than in 
days could greatly improve a health services 
ability to cope—see trust induction Figure 2. 
While a portion of these induction processes 
can perhaps be ignored, trusts still have to meet 
strict legal requirements around identity 
verification2—this all takes time which could 
be spent saving lives.
This seems to be the opportune moment to 
develop and deploy an SSI solution. However, 
it is imperative that any solution that is 
developed, especially if rushed through during a 
crisis, is clear about what it wants to achieve 
and for whom. Furthermore, these solutions 
should identify a process by which to validate 
how well they are meeting the predefined 
aims and requirements of those who are 
actually going to be using it—healthcare 
professionals.
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